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CAN THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT SURVIVE
WITHOUT TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT?

"When you can't breathe, you have to fight. You can't die in
silence."'
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection: The Paradigm Case

The struggle for environmental justice persists in South Camden, New Jersey.2 South Camden Citizens in Action, a group of
Waterfront South residents, seek to bring their claim for justice
before the United States Supreme Court. 3 At issue is the placement
of a local cement factory, which the NewJersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) authorized to emit sixty tons of dust
into the air annually. 4 The legality of emitting this massive amount
of pollution is alarming.5 More startling, however, is that this facil-

ity merely represents the most recent addition to a community already plagued by pollution-producing sites. 6 With sixty-one percent
of Waterfront South residents reporting respiratory ailments, the
South Camden Citizens in Action argue that they simply cannot tol1. Diana Lasseter Drake, Fightingfor Breath: In a Pollution-clogged Camden Neighborhood, Community Activists Are Determined to Win the Right to Clean Air, N.J.
MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 2002, at 27 (quoting citizen of Waterfront South, Ivan Foster).
2. See id. at 27 (providing background to S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter South Camden III]
lawsuit). Due to its demographics, Waterfront South serves as a classic example of
a community experiencing the disparate effects of pollution and hazardous waste.
Id. African-American and Hispanic groups constitute nearly ninety percent of
South Camden citizens. Id. The community's median household income is
$15,000 a year, one of the poorest in the nation, Id.
3. See Shannon P. Duffy, Court Will Not Rehear Camden Cement Plant Case, PA.
LAW WEEKLY, Jan. 21, 2002, at 3 (stating U.S. Supreme Court is plaintiffs' last opportunity to prevent cement plant from operating in their neighborhood).
4. See Drake, supra note 1, at 27. The dust results from the cement factory's
process of grinding slag, a by-product of steel manufacturing that is added to cement. Id.
5. See id. (discussion emission of such pollution).
6. See id. (describing environmental hazards in South Camden). South Camden contains a trash-to-steam incinerator, a sewage treatment plant and two
Superfund sites. See id.
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erate these conditions anymore. 7 While public interest groups,
members of industry, governmental officials, and environmental
law practitioners monitor this case, the community's hope rests on
whether the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari for
South Camden Citizens in Action v. NJDEP.8

B.

Environmental Justice

The environmental justice movement emerged from a number
of grassroots organizations concerned with combating the harmful
effects of hazardous waste facilities in minority communities. 9 Advocates of the environmental justice movement contend that minority communities have been disproportionately chosen to site
hazardous waste facilities as a result of environmental racism.' 0
Generally, these advocates define "environmental racism" as "racial
discrimination in environmental policymaking and the unequal enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."' In combating
12
this phenomenon, the movement raises three major concerns.
7. See id. The article suggests that the high percentage of respiratory ailments
experienced by the citizens of South Camden may be linked to airborne pollutants
released by the various facilities in the neighborhood. Id.
8. See Duffy, supra note 3, at 3 (describing case as Third Circuit's most important 2001 civil rights case); see also Brian S. Montag & Catherine Trinkle, Environmental Justice at a Crossroads: Third Circuit Eliminates the Right of Private Plaintiffs to
Enforce Title VI DisparateImpact Regulations in Federal Court, N.J. LAW JOURNAL, Feb.
25, 2002, at 5 (reviewing Third Circuit's decision).
On June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari for this
case. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. 122 S. Ct. 2621
(2002).
9. SeeJohn R. Kyte, Comment, EnvironmentalJustice: The Need for Equal Enforcement and Sound Science, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'' 253, 258-63 (1994)
(describing use of environmental justice movement). The author follows the
evolution of the environmental justice movement from its disorganized roots in

the early 1980s to its current status as one of the nation's most pressing concerns.
See id.
10. Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A
Critique of EnvironmentalJustice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 121
(1997) (stating minority communities are chosen to site hazardous waste facilities
due to racism). The article proposes two different definitions of the term "environmental racism." See id. at 125. Under the first definition, commentators suggest that racism motivates those who site locally undesirable environmental land
uses. See id. The second definition encompasses action not tied to purposeful discrimination or racial animus. See id. at 126. It also includes "any policy, practice,
or directive that, intentionally or unintentionally, differentially impacts or disadvantages individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color." Id.
11. See Kyte, supra note 9, at 258-63. The author defines "environmental racism" as "the deliberate targeting of people of color communities for toxic waste
facilities and the official sanctioning of a life-threatening presence of poisons and
pollutants in people of color communities." Id.
12. See Kevin, supra note 10, at 122 (summarizing major concerns presented
by environmental justice advocates).
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First, advocates note that minority communities are more likely to
be chosen as a site for locally undesirable environmental land uses
(LULUs), thereby exposing these communities to more harmful
environmental conditions.13 Second, racism, either generally or on
the part of land developers, provides the explanation of this phenomenon.' 4 Finally, advocates seek to remedy the problem
5
through judicial and legislative action.'
Environmental justice advocates use two distinct methods to
counter the harm caused by environmental racism: community activism and litigation.' 6 Presently, environmental justice litigation
claims have achieved only limited success. 17 Despite the lack of pos13. See id. (discussing main focus of environmental justice advocates).
14. Id. but cf. Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under 7itle VI
of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVWL. L. 285, 291-97 (1995) (arguing minority communities are more likely to be chosen for locally undesirable environmental land uses
[hereinafter LULUs]). Fisher presents and rejects the most popular arguments
denying that minorities are disproportionately affected by environmental harm because of environmental racism, therefore making Title VI inapplicable to these
claims. See id. at 291. The first argument avers that minority communities are
heavily polluted because they lack political power to keep pollution out. See id. at
292. Second, market forces are responsible for the amount of pollution in the
minority community. See id. This argument relies on the premise that differences
in income, not race, explain the distribution of environmental hazards, and that
discrimination based on poverty is not unconstitutional. See id. The final argument relies on the "coming to the nuisance" theory. See id. at 294. Advocates of
this theory argue that hazardous waste sites attract minorities because of nearby
jobs, affordable housing, and the greater availability of public transportation in
such urban areas. See id.
15. Kevin, supra note 10, at 122. The author discusses various proposed and
existing administrative and legislative remedies used to counter environmental racism. See id. at 128-33. He states that no existing state or national body has created
remedies for environmental racism through legislation. See id. at 130. Proposed
federal legislation nearly succeeded in requiring siting authorities to incorporate
racial criteria in decision-making. See id. at 131 (discussing Environmental Equal
Rights Act of 1993, H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993)). The bill allowed citizens to
challenge the placement of a waste facility in an already environmentally disadvantaged community. See id.
16. Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge
Environmental Racism: From Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval, 2 J.L. Soc'v 5, 5
(2001) (providing methods for counteracting environmental racism). Methods of
battling environmental racism through environmental activism include grassroots
lobbying, community involvement and adjustments to the environmental planning
process. See Major Willie A. Gunn, From the Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks:
Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIo N.U. L.
Rv. 1227, 1231 (1996) (discussing methods of remedying environmental racism).
The author discusses ways in which low income and minority communities coupled
with government institutions can remedy the current situation. Id. The article
discusses strategies that could potentially reach out to minority communities
through education on environmental issues as well as increased governmental
awareness and sensitivity toward minority injuries. Id. at 1288.
17. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1273. Cases brought tinder both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

3

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5

126

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV: p. 123

itive results, commentators and analysts have remained hopeful that
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act will provide a basis for environmental justice claims. 18 This optimism has been stymied by a number of recent cases holding that Title VI does not support a private
cause of action for enforcing disparate-impact regulations. 19
This Comment evaluates the state of environmental litigation
after two recent cases, Alexander v. Sandovat20 and South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of EnvironmentalProtection (South Camden
III).21 The United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals suggest that Title VI claims will not provide environmental justice litigants with the success that they had once
hoped for. 22 This Comment concludes that litigation will play a

much less significant role in the environmental justice movement.
Part II provides a historical background of the environmental justice movement. 2 3 Part III discusses litigation strategies used in environmental cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 Part III further evaluates

the use of Title VI as a vehicle for environmental litigation. 25 Part
III concludes with a discussion of Sandoval and South Camden III illustrating the difficulties litigants have encountered using Title VI
Act of 1964 have been stymied by the reqtirement that plaintiffs prove intent to
discriminate in order to prevail. See id. at 1283-85.
18. See generally Fisher, supra note 14, at 288-89 (providing background of Title VI litigation in environmental racism). Fisher argues that Title VI can and
should be used to achieve environmental justice. Id. The article examines difficulties Title VI litigants may face and poses potential solutions for clearing these hurdles. Id.
19. See generally, 3rd Circuit Reverses 'Environmental Racism' Case, PA. LAW
WEEKLY, Dec. 24, 2001, at 7 (discussing lawyer's strategy in South Camden Il); Marcia Coyle, Making Pollution a Civil Rights Issue, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 24, 2001, at A13
(indicating United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval held no Title VI
private cause of action); Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Reverses South Camden Case,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 18, 2001, at 1 (noting that Sandoval forced South
Camden III lawyers to argue under § 1983).
20. 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001) (holding no private cause of action to enforce
regulations under § 602 of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
21. South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 771 (3d Cir. 2001).
22. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval, see infra notes 104-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in South Camden III, see infra notes 139-85 and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the historical background of the environmental justice
movement, see infra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of litigation strategies used by environmental advocates,
see infra notes 51-185 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the use of Title VI, see infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol14/iss1/5

4

Madrid: Can the Environmental Justice Movement Survive without Title VI o
2003]

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

in environmental racism claims. 26 Part IV discusses the ramifications of Sandoval and South Camden III and their effects on the fu27
ture of the environmental justice movement.

II.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Dr. Benjamin Chavis is credited with coining the term "envi-

ronmental racism." 28 Dr. Chavis was responsible for organizing
protestors in North Carolina in an attempt to prevent the construction of a disposal facility for poly-chlorinated biphenyls. 29 Dr.
Chavis and his fellow protestors disputed the choice of the predom-

inately African-American Warren County as the site for the facility. 30 Although Dr. Chavis and his organization of protestors
ultimately proved unsuccessful in preventing the facility from being
31

built, the incident attracted national attention.
A number of empirical studies analyzing the correlation between LULUs and the racial makeup of surrounding areas followed
the Warren County demonstrations. 32 In 1983, a General Accounting Office study found that African-Americans made up the majority of the population in three of four chosen hazardous waste sites
located in various areas in the southern United States.3 3 The study
26. For a discussion of the facts and analysis of Sandoval,see infra notes 104-38
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts and analysis of South Camden
III, see infra notes 139-85 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the impact of South Camden III and Sandoval, see infra
notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
28. See Kyte, supra note 9, at 259 (discussing Dr. Chavis's role in environmental justice movement).
29. See id. Dr. Chavis's efforts resulted in the collaboration of more than 500
local and national civil rights activists. Id. Like many areas allegedly affected by
environmental racism, Warren County was a predominately black community. Id.
30. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1228 (discussing background of Warren
County Protest). Warren County had the highest African-American population in
North Carolina. Id.
31. See Valerie P. Mahoney, EnvironmentalJustice: From Partial Victories to Complete Solutions, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 361, 363 (Oct. 1999) (noting Warren County
protest brought environmental justice claims to forefront); see also Kyte, supra note
9, at 259 (discussing effects of Warren County protest on environmental activist
movement). Through the protest, the activists developed a greater understanding
and appreciation of the interrelatedness of environmental issues, quality of life
and the racial make up of communities. See id.; see also Fisher, supra note 14, at
296 (citing Warren County as first time mainstream civil rights groups worked on
environmental issue).
32. See generally Kyte, supra note 9, at 260-63 (providing information on environmental racism studies taking place after Warren County protest).
33. See id. at 260. The General Accounting Office study evaluated the racial
and socio-economic status of communities surrounding four hazardous waste landfills located in southeastern United States. Id. The landfills, found in Alabama,
North Carolina and South Carolina, were located in Environmental Protection
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also noted that twenty-six percent of the area's population had in3 4
come levels below the poverty line.
A later study examined whether the pattern of so-called "environmental racism" existed on a national level.3 5 In 1987, the
United Church of Christ used U.S. Census data to evaluate the correlation between hazardous waste site locations and the racial composition of the surrounding communities.3 6 The study showed: (1)
that race played a more significant role than income in the siting of
hazardous waste facilities; (2) communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the highest composition of racial and ethnic residents; (3) communities with a
commercial hazardous waste facility averaged twice the average minority percentage of the population as communities without such a
facility. 37 Based on the compiled data, the study concluded that the
disproportionate numbers of racial and ethnic persons residing in
communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities was not a
38
random occurrence.
These studies sparked interaction between citizen groups and
legislatures aimed at developing policies to ensure environmental
justice. 19 The movement further advanced with exposure gained
from commentary in law publications and general media. 40 In reAgency's Region IV. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1228-29 (describing location of
study). Though African-Americans made tIp merely twenty percent of the population in these areas, they were in the majority in three of the four communities
studied. Id.
34. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1228-29. The study showed that African-Americans constituted between fifty-two and ninety percent of the population in three
out of the four communities. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 297. Though the fourth
community was only three percent African-American, the surrounding four-mile
radius was between sixty and ninety-two percent African-American. Id. All of the
communities had significant percentages of the population below the poverty line.
Id.
35, See Fisher, supra note 14, at 297.
36. Id. The study used an Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter
EPA] database and census data to compare the demographic makeup of the zip
code areas containing 415 known commercial hazardous waste facilities to zip code
areas without such facilities. Id.
37. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1239 (discussing findings of UCC report).
38. See id. (quoting Charles Lee, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A
National Report on the Racial and Socio-economic Characteristicsof Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, United Church of Christ's Commission on RacialJustice (1987)). The
study also addressed the potential for adverse health effects in these communities.
See id.
39. See id. at 1229 (discussing 1991 citizen group conference in Washington
D.C.).
40. See id. at 1229-30; see also Fisher, supra note 14, at 301 (analyzing 1992
study released by National LawJournal addressing unequal enforcement of federal
environmental laws between white and minority communities). The report ex-
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sponse to the movement's increased exposure, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a 1992 report suggesting policies that furthered environmental equity. 4' In 1993,
EPA released another report on hazardous chemicals stating, "the
greatest amount of [Toxic Release Inventory] chemicals and the
most toxic of the [these] chemicals are being released in communities that are least able to cope with them
'4 2
come, undereducated.

. . . -

non-white, low-in-

In February 1994, President Clinton acknowledged the importance of environmental justice by promulgating Executive Order
12,898. 4 3 This Order required all federal agencies to implement
policies promoting environmental justice "to the greatest extent
practicable and permitted by law." 44 The Order had two major ef-

fects. First, the Order pressured local siting authorities to comply
amined the pace of cleanup at toxic waste sites in the EPA's superfund program
and concluded:
1. that RCRA fines were 506% higher in white areas than in minority
areas,
2. that the average of all enforcement fines was 46% higher in white areas
than minority areas,
3. that while Superfund penalties were 9% higher in minority than in
white communities, the former communities waited an average of 20%
longer to have a site placed on the National Priority List (NPL), and
4. that while in white areas "treatment" if the waste at contaminated sites
was chosen 22% more often than its mere containment, in minority areas
the opposite was true - - containment was chosen 7% more frequently
than treatment.
Id. at 301-02.
41. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1229. The report was produced by an EPA
Environmental Equity Workgroup comprised of officers from various regional offices. See id. The workgroup began its work in July, 1990 under the leadership of
EPA Administrator William K. Reilly. See id. The report was released in May, 1992.
See id.
42. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 300 (quoting ControversialReport on Health Effects in Poor Areas of Tennessee Released by EPA, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Dec. 3,
1993)).
43. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321
(1994).
44. See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA 's Title VI
Regulations? The Need to Empower EnvironmentalJusticePlaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVr.
L. 1, 3 (1999) (citing Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995)); see also Fisher,
supra note 14, at 314-15.
[The Order requires] all agencies to establish a mechanism to monitor
and ensure compliance with Title VI whenever its programs have environmental consequences; programs that gather data about environmental racism; enforcement activity, such as EPA's investigations of the racial
impacts of statutory schemes that govern the siting of polluting facilities;
and continuing rhetorical encouragement and recognition that serves to
legitimize the environmental justice movement and alert industry to the
importance of the issue.
Fisher, supra note 14, at 315.
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with environmental justice policies by committing federal investiga45
tive resources to the examination of environmental racism claims.
Second, the Order fostered a supportive atmosphere for environmental racism claims under Title VI by instituting a system that
46
makes information available to potential litigants.
While Order 12,898 greatly advanced the environmental justice movement, environmental racism litigants still faced two major
obstacles. 47 Section 6-609 of the Order limited citizens' abilities to
enforce certain provisions by stating that there is no right to judicial
review against the United States pursuant to the Order. 4 Furthermore, while the presidential directive accompanying the Order required specific federal agencies to comply with Title VI of the Civil
49
Rights Act, it did not provide a means for judicial enforcement.
The Order, therefore, caused adverse impacts to litigants by failing
50
to provide a right of redress in administrative actions.
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LITIGATION

A. A Look Back: Equal Protection Claims
Environmental justice plaintiffs initially based environmental
racism claims on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 l The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from
denying equal protection of the law to any person within its jurisdiction.5 2 Under Equal Protection jurisprudence, when the government uses race or national origin in distributing benefits or
burdens, such action is subject to a stringent strict scrutiny standard. 53 Environmental justice litigants argued that government
45. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 315 (discussing results of Clinton administration's policies on environmental justice).
46. See id. (discussing second effect of directive).
47. See Mank, supra note 44, at 3 (discussing Executive Order's limitations).
48. See id. (citing Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995)).
49. See id. The Order pertains to agencies that affect human health or the
environment and use federal money to provide funding for programs. See id.
50. See id. Litigants are unable to enforce the directive in a court of law. See
id. Furthermore, the directive does not expand a party's rights under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act. See id.
51. See id. at 10 (discussing use of Equal Protection claims to combat environmental racism).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause states, "No
State ... shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
53. See Kevin, supra note 10, at 146 (analyzing environmental racism claims
under Equal Protection Clause). Under a strict scrutiny standard, a government
agent must show that the proposed action is necessary to advance a compelling
governmental interest. See id. The action must also be narrowly tailored to further
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agencies violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by dispropor54
tionately allowing waste sites to be built in minority communities.
Although the Equal Protection argument appeared strong, environmental racism litigants had difficulties with its practical application. 55 Many Equal Protection claims proved unsuccessful
because they required plaintiffs to overcome a high evidentiary burden of proof.5 6 In Washington v. Davis,57 the United States Supreme
Court held that a showing of discriminatory intent was a necessary
element for an Equal Protection claim.5 8 In Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Co., 59 the United States
Supreme Court expanded the intent requirement by holding that
plaintiffs must "introduce at least some circumstantial evidence that
the defendant intended to discriminate against an identifiable minority group. ' 60 In Arlington Heights, the Court determined that a
plaintiff could prove discriminatory intent using the following five
factors: (1) the official action's impact, (2) the decision's historical
background, (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision, (4) any substantive or procedural departures
from the normal decision-making process and (5) the legislative or
administrative history of the challenged decision. 6 1
Inherent difficulties with Equal Protection claims in environmental justice cases became apparent in Bean v. Southwestern Waste

that interest. See id. Should the action fail to meet these standards it will be found
unconstitutional. See id.
54. See Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VIA Magic Bullet? Environmental Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 1, 22 (1996) (explaining early environmental racism litigant's use of
Equal Protection Clause as theoretically sound).
55. See Kyte, supra note 9, at 263-68 (noting difficulties with using Equal Protection Clause).
56. See id. (discussing lack of success in using Equal Protection Clause as basis
for environmental racism claims).
57. 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (holding law or act is not unconstitutional
where racially disproportionate impact occurs absent discriminatory intent).
58. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 303-06 (explaining seminal United States Supreme Court Equal Protection cases).
59. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The case involved a challenge to the local housing
authority's decision to disallow construction of racially integrated housing. See id.
at 264.
60. Mank, supra note 44, at 10 (examining effect of Vill. of Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), on plaintiffs burden of proof in
Equal Protection Clause claim).
61. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-69 (summarizing important factors to
consider when evaluating claim of discriminatory intent); see Mank, supra note 44,
at 10 n.37 (discussing Arlington Heights five-part test).
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Management Corp.62 In Bean, a minority resident group attempted to
enjoin the Texas Department of Health and the Southwestern
Waste Management Corporation from building a solid waste facility. 63 The community group argued that these parties engaged in a
discriminatory pattern of placing facilities in minority communities. 64 The community group supported their argument with statistical evidence suggesting that the overwhelming majority of waste
sites were placed in communities consisting of predominately minority populations. 65 The District Court of the Southern District of
Texas held that plaintiffs use of statistical evidence was insufficient

to prove discriminatory intent. 66 Plaintiffs case failed for two reasons: first, the plaintiff lacked direct evidence supporting discriminatory intent, and second, the court found that the statistical data
67
failed to prove a strong pattern of discriminatory treatment.

Environmental racism litigants faced similar difficulties in EastBibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning and Zoning
Commission.6 8 In East-Bibb, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected plaintiffs' claim that granting a sanitary landfill permit in
an African-American community violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 Plaintiffs, residents of a
62. Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979); see also, Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 20-21 (discussing Bean as pioneer environmental justice case brought under Equal Protection Clause).
63. See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 674-75 (noting facts of Bean); see Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 20-21 (stating background of Bean).
64. See Bean, 48 F. Supp. at 675. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. See id. at 674-75. Defendants denied
the discrimination claim and moved to dismiss it on the grounds of abstention,
laches, and the absence of state action. See id. at 675-76.
65. See id. at 678. The data showed that approximately thirty-two percent of
the city's solid waste sites could be found in the western half of the city where more
than seventy-three percent of the Caucasian citizens lived. See id. Sixty-seven percent of the sites were in the eastern half of the city, where sixty-one percent of the
minority population lived. See id.
66. See id. at 677 (stating court's evaluation of statistical evidence).
67. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 1276 (discussing flaws of plaintiffs' claims in
Bean).
68. East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264, 1264 (11 th Cir. 1989). The case involved a company's
petition to build a landfill for paper, wood and other slowly decomposing products. See id. African-Americans constituted sixty-five percent of the census tract.
See id.
69. See id. at 1265. The complaint alleged the following four constitutional
violations:
1. Mullis and the Commission denied them procedural due process rights
under applicable zoning regulations;
2. Mullis's and the Commission's actions denied them substantive due
process because the Commission's decision to grant Mullis a conditional
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predominately African-American community in Macon, Georgia, alleged that the decision to site a landfill in their community resulted
from an ongoing pattern of racial animus on the part of the local
Planning and Zoning Commission.11 Using the Arlington Heights
standard, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statistical evidence of disparate impact was insufficient to support the
7
Equal Protection claim. 1

B.

The Present: Title VI as the Basis for Environmental Racism
Claims

In response to the shortcomings of Equal Protection claims,
environmental justice advocates have looked to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 believing that, unlike Equal Protection claims,
Title VI would not require plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent. 72 South Camden III suggests that using Title VI may not be as
effective as legal analysts once predicted. 73 Part One of this section
examines the language and structure of Title VI both generally and
as it applies to environmental racism litigation.7 4 Part One will further focus on the pivotal issues that dictate the scope and effectiveness of Title VI. 75 Part Two of this section discusses Title VI case
law illustrating the benefits and difficulties in using Title VI as the
76
basis for an environmental racism claim.

use permit did not relate to public health, safety, morality, or general
welfare;
3. The Commission's decision to grant Mullis a conditional use permit
constituted a taking without just compensation; and
4. Mullis's and the Commission's choice of a landfill site denied them
equal protection of the law because the decision affected more black persons than white persons. Mullis and the Commission moved to dismiss
the residents' action.
Id.
70. See id. at 1264-65. Nearly 3,367 black residents and 2,149 white residents
lived on the property considered for the site. Id. at 1264
71. See id. at 1266-67. In evaluating the Commission's actions, the court
agreed with the district court's finding that "the Commission carefully and
thoughtfully addressed a serious problem and that it made a decision based upon
the merits and not upon any improper racial animus." Id. at 1266.
72. See Mank, supra note 44, at 12 (discussing importance of Title VI of Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
73. See South Camden II, 274 F.3d 771, 791 (3d Cir. 2001).
74. For a general discussion of the structure of Title VI, see infra notes 77-95
and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of interpretation issues affecting the use of Title VI in
environmental racism litigation, see infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of Title VI case law, see infra notes 104-85 and accompanying text.
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Using Title VI to Enforce EnvironmentalJustice

Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race or national origin in federally funded programs and activities. 77 Environmental
racism litigants seeking relief under Title VI make the following argument: The EPA grants funding to state and local environmental
agencies. 78 In turn, these agencies are responsible for implementing the nation's environmental policies. 79 An environmental justice
litigant, therefore, has a cause of action under Title VI if one of

these federally funded agencies implements environmental policies
in a discriminatory manner. 80
Though the basic arguments of Title VI appear straightforward, enforcing Title VI through the statute is more complex. 8'
Sections 601 and 602 of the Civil Rights Act provide two potential
mechanisms for enforcement.8 2 Section 601 provides that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity" covered
by Title VI. 8 3 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,84 the United States
Supreme Court interpreted section 601 as allowing citizens to file
private lawsuits challenging the discriminatory actions of any recipient of federal funds.8 5 A claim brought under section 601, how77. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
78. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 287 (setting out basic Title VI argument).
79. See id. EPA establishes guidelines on pollution standards and permits
waste treatment and disposal facilities. See id. EPA is also responsible for determining the placement of such facilities. See id.
80. See id. Discrimination by a federally-funded agency theoretically opens
the party tip to a civil suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. See id.
81. See id. at 291 (presenting and discrediting basic Title VI arguments for
environmental claims).
82. See Mank, supra note 44, at 3-4 (discussing methods of enforcement under
§§ 601 and 602).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002) (noting provisions of § 601).
84. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, Petitioner, a female applicant to the University of Chicago Medical School, alleged.that she was denied admission based on
her sex. See id. at 680. Petitioner based her claim on Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. See id. The statute provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...."Id. at 681-82 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2002)). The Court recognized that "Title IX was patterned after Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 694. The Court noted that the parallel
language between Title IX and Title VI and the legislative history of Title IX allowed the Court to find an implied right of action. See id. at 694-98. The Court
made this conclusion because Title VI had an established private remedy when
Title IX was drafted. See id. at 696-97.
85. See id. at 717 (holding that private right of action exists in enforcing Title
VI). Congress has declared that states cannot invoke sovereign immunity against
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ever, requires plaintiffs to prove that recipients of federal funds
engaged in intentional discrimination. 86 The standard is, therefore, identical to the difficult intent requirement of the Equal Pro87
tection Clause.
Section 602 states that federal agencies shall issue regulations
that specify how agencies should deal with recipients of federal
funds who implement policies resulting in disparate impacts.88 Section 602 also provides federal agencies with guidelines on how to
investigate and assess claims of racial discrimination. 8 9 Specifically,
section 602 gives federal agencies discretion in deciding whether to
fund an agency that engages in discriminatory practices. 90 Furthermore, section 602 authorizes EPA regulations that address disparate
impact by forbidding federal recipients from using "criteria or
method[s] of administering its program which have the effect of
subject[ing] individual[s] to discrimination because of their race,
color, national origin, or sex."9 1
An inconsistency between section 601 and 602 leads to difficulties in implementing Title VI. Under section 601, plaintiffs must
prove that a recipient of federal funds has participated in intentional discrimination. 92 Section 602 allows agencies to create regusuits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI and that private plaintiffs have
access to "remedies both at law and in equity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2002).
86. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (holding
that § 601 prohibits only racial classifications that would violate Equal Protection
Clause of Fifth Amendment).
87. See Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 8-9 (discussing scope of § 601 of
Civil Rights Act).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Section 602 authorizes federal agencies "to effectuate the provisions of [section 601] . . .by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability." Id.; see also Mank, supra note 44, at 12 (discussing § 602).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. The statute states,
Each Federal department and agency ...

is authorized and directed to

effectuate the provisions of section 601 [42 USCS § 2000d (2002)] with
respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders
of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection
with which the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
90. See id. The relevant provision states,
[c]ompliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there
has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing,
of failure to comply with such requirement ....

Id.
91. Montag & Trinkle, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001)).
92. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (holding that § 601 supports only
claims of intentional discrimination).
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lations that effectuate the provisions of section 601. 93 Agencies,

however, have promulgated valid regulations under section 602
that prohibit recipients of federal funds from implementing policies that result in disparate impact discrimination. 94 Resolving the
distinctions between these differing standards has posed problems
for Title VI plaintiffs because section 602 allows agency enforcement for disparate impact discrimination while section 601 simply
95
provides a private cause of action for intentional discrimination.
a.

Options for Challengingan Agency: FederalLawsuit or
Administrative Complaint

When seeking relief, an environmental justice complainant
must decide whether to bring an administrative complaint or a federal lawsuit. 96 Environmental justice advocates find lawsuits advantageous for various reasons. 97 Lawsuits allow the litigant to take an
active role in the investigation and provide for remedies unavailable
in administrative complaints.9 8 Because of the desirable features of
a lawsuit, the major issue becomes whether environmental justice
plaintiffs have a private right of action under section 602 of Title
VI.
b.

Is There a Claim of Right? A Discussion of Rights and
Remedies

Generally, a private right of action exists when legislatures expressly authorize persons injured in violation of regulatory statutes
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (noting § 602 of 1964 Civil Rights Act focuses on
agencies regulating, not individuals protected).
94. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). The regulations state,
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or HAVING TFIE EFFECT OF defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of objectives of the

program with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national
origin, or sex.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (differentiating between enforcement
standards of § 601 and § 602).
96. See Mank, supra note 44, at 20.
97. See id. at 22-23. Though less costly, filing an administrative complaint has

a number of disadvantages. See id. First, the complainant does not take an active
role in investigation when filing an administrative complaint. See id. Second, the
agency has no time restrictions in conducting the investigation. See id. Finally,
administrative complaints offer more limited remedies. See id.

98. See id. at 23-24 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of bringing
lawsuit).
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to bring suit directly against the alleged violator. 99 A difficult issue
arises when a regulatory statute does not create this right, because
the court must then interpret the statute to determine whether
Congress intended to create both a private right of action as well as
a private remedy. 10 0 If the statutory intent does not support both a
private right and remedy, the court is not at liberty to create one
despite its desirability or compatibility with the statute. 10 1
Though the Supreme Court has established a private right of
action under section 601, the plaintiff's high evidentiary burden of
proving intentional discrimination impedes this right.'0 2 The crucial question, therefore, centers on whether a private right of action
exists to enforce disparate-impact discrimination under section
602.103
2.

Title VI Caselaw: Does Section 602 Provide a Claim of Right?
a. Alexander v. Sandoval

In Sandoval, the United States Supreme Court addressed
"whether private individuals may sue to enforce disparate-impact
regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."104 The plaintiff in Sandoval challenged a Department of
Transportation policy that made drivers' license examinations exclusively in English.1 0 5 Plaintiff argued that the English-only policy
violated section 602 because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on national origin.' 0 6 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
99. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (discussing private
causes of action).
100. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15
(1979)).
101. Id. at 286-87. The Court stated that Congress alone can create private
rights of action to enforce federal law. See id. at 286. Judges are relegated to

searching for statutory intent to create a private right and remedy. See id.
102. See generally Vili. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (discussing intent requirement for equal protection claims).
103. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 276 (stating that private right of action must therefore come from independent force from § 602).
104. Id. at 278. Petitioner, Alabama Department of Public Safety, was subject

to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they received financial assistance
from the United States Department of Justice and Department of Transportation.

See id.
105. Id. at 279. The change in policy followed Alabama's decision to declare
English the official language in a 1990 state constitutional amendment. See id. at

278-79. Petitioners argue that the decision to administer driver's license examinations exclusively in English advanced public safety. See id. at 279.
106. Id. (stating respondent's basic argument).
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found this argument persuasive and enjoined the policy, ordering
the Department to accommodate non-English speakers.' 0 7 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, thereby rejecting defendant's argument that Title
VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the
regulation. 108
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not support a freestanding private right of action under section 602.10 9 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia began the Court's analysis by reviewing three
setded Title VI principles. 10 First, Title VI, section 601 enables individuals to sue for both injunctive relief and damages."I ' Second,
2
section 601 reaches only cases of intentional discrimination."
Third, regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI may
validly proscribe activities that result in a disparate impact on racial
groups, even when section 601 allows such activities. 113 The Court
declared that despite these three concessions, it does not follow
that Congress intended to create a private right of action to enforce
disparate impact regulations. 114 The Court stated that a cause of
107. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1313-16 (M.D. Ala. 1998),
rev'd, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). While the court appreciated the legislature's desire to
foster a homogeneous people with American ideals, the means adopted exceeded
the state's power. See id. at 1315.
108. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 487 (11th Cir. 1999), affg7 F. Supp.
2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). The court recognized that
the appellant's stated justifications for the English-only policy were only a pretext
and that the district court's conclusion that the policy results in unlawful disparate
impact was correct. See id. at 510.
109. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). The Court stated,
"[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under section 602." Id.
110. See id. at 279. These aspects of Title VI emerged from prior Supreme
Court decisions, Congressional amendments of Title VI and concessions of the
parties to the case. See id.
111. See id. at 279-80 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. 67 (1979)). The decision declared that a private cause of action existed under Title VI. See id. The parallel
language of Title IX suggested that it contained a private cause of action also. Id.
112. See id. at 280. The Court stated that section 601 "proscribe [s] only those
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. (quoting language from Bakke); see also Guardians Assn. of N.Y.
Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see also Sandoval v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (stating that Title VI prohibits only intentional
discrimination).
113. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280. The Court states that though no holding
supports this principle, they will assume its accuracy for the purpose of deciding
the case. Id.
114. Id. at 284. The Court noted that this finding does not affect the cause of
action under section 601's ban on intentional discrimination. See id. The Court
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action exists only when Congress creates regulations applying section 601's ban on intentional discrimination because those regulations construe the statute itself.1 15 Regulations supporting
disparate-impact under section 602 would not support a claim of
right unless section 602 had the authority to provide one. 116
The Court subsequently examined whether section 602 displays Congressional intent to create both a private right of action
and a private remedy. 117 The Court stated that absent Congressional intent a cause of action does not exist. 11 The Court further
rejected the theory that "it is the duty of the courts ... to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose [expressed by a statute]."119 The Court instead limited its
search for Congress's intent to the text and structure of Title VI.1 20
In interpreting Title VI, the Court first noted that section 602
does not contain the rights-creating language that allowed the
Court to find a claim of right under section 601 in Cannon.12' In
particular, the Court found that while section 601 focuses on the
person being protected, section 602 deals with the regulating
agency and not with the person regulating.1 22 The Court concluded that this distinction in statutory language created "no implistated, "[a] Congress that intends the statute to be enforced through a private
cause of action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well." Id.
115. See id. (arguing regulations under § 601 support claim of right but regulations under § 602 cannot be enforced under § 601's claim of right).
116. See id. at 286 (arguing § 602 must have independent force to create private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations).
117. See id. The Court assumed for the purpose of discussion that section 602
granted the authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations. See id.
118. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87. "Without [intent], a cause of action does
not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as
a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute." Id. at 287 (quotingJ.J. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
119. Id. at 287 (abandoning Borak method of discerning and defining causes
of action).
120. See id. at 288. To emphasize the Court's departure from past methods of
interpreting private causes of action the Court stated, "[h] aving sworn off the habit
of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept respondents' invitation
to have one last drink." Id. at 287.
121. See id. (noting that rights-creating language is absent from 602). The
language of 601 states "[n]o person ...

shall .

.

. be subjected to discrimination"

while 602 provides that "[e]ach Federal department and agency... is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of [601]." The Court distinguished the
focus of the statue in section 601 on the person protected and the focus in section
602 where an agency is being regulated. See id. at 288-89.
122. See id. at 289. The Court reasoned that "the focus of 602 is twice removed from the individuals who will ultimately benefit from Title VI's protection
because it focuses neither on the individual being protected nor the individual
regulating." Id. Rather, it focuses on the agency doing the regulating. See id.
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cation of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of
persons."

123

The Court found, moreover, that the method of enforcing the
authorized regulations under 602 precluded a finding of congressional intent to create a private right of action. 124 The Court noted
that section 602 grants agencies the power to terminate funding to
a particular program that has violated section 602's regulations but
only after a lengthy and involved process. 125 The Court concluded
that these intricate restrictions on an agency's actions suggest that a
private right of action does not exist because "[t] he express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that
126
Congress intended to preclude others."'
The Court addressed respondent's argument that Guardians
and Cannon provide support for a private cause of action to enforce
disparate impact regulations. 27 The Court rejected respondent's
argument, stating that "[this] Court is bound by holdings, not language." 128 The Court then declared that Cannon was decided
under the assumption that respondents intentionally discriminated
against petitioner. 29 The Court further noted that Guardianssup123. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287, 294 (1981)).
124. See id. (analyzing methods of enforcing § 602 for finding intent to create
right).
125. See id. at 289-90 (setting out process for termination of funds). The
Court interpreted the statute as requiring the following procedures. See id. First,
the agency must advise the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and further see if compliance can be secured through voluntary means. See id. After enforcement, the agency's action is subject to judicial
review. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (2002)). To terminate funding, the agency
must "file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances
and the grounds for such action." Id. at 290 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2002)).
Finally, the termination of funding does not take place until thirty days after the
report has been filed. Id.
126. Id. at'290. The Court notes that there is no congressional intent that
supports a private right of action under section 602. See id. at 291. This analysis,
therefore, is not crucial to the Court's decision because the issue is not presented.
See id.
127. See id. at 282-84 (rejecting argument because no Supreme Court case
held that Title VI provides private cause of action for enforcing disparate-impact
regulations). In Guardians,Black and Hispanic police officers argued that the New
York Police Department hired and fired in a discriminatory manner. Guardians
Assn. of N.Y. Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 585 (1983).
128. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282 (rejecting claim that Guardians and Cannon
support implied cause of action under § 602 to enforce regulations barring disparate-impact discrimination).
129. See id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 680 (1979))
(stating respondents admitted petitioner was denied admittance to school because
she was female).
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ported recovery of compensatory damages under Title VI only
upon a showing of intentional discrimination. 30 Though five justices voted to uphold disparate impact regulations, three stated that
the case did not require them to decide whether a private right of
action exists under the regulations.' 3 ' The Court concluded
neither Cannon nor Guardians held that a private right of action
132
exists.
The Court further rejected respondent's argument that the
regulations alone contain rights-creating language, thereby making
them enforceable. 133 The Court invoked a basic tenet of administrative law stating, "[1] anguage in a regulation may invoke a private
right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it
may not create a right that Congress has not."' 34 The Court thus
concluded that respondent's argument "skips an analytical step" because section 602 does not authorize such a right. 35
Similarly, the Court rejected respondent's argument that subsequent amendments to Title VI ratified the Court's decisions finding an implied private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations. 36 The Court first noted that none of its decisions established or even assumed that a private right of action exists. 137
Furthermore, the Court determined that respondent's argument
for incorporation was flawed because neither amendment related
to implied causes of action.' 3 8

130. See id. at 282-83 (discussing split decision in Guardians).
131. See id. (stating that justices who found case did not address question).
132. See id. at 284. The majority noted that the dissent found Guardians did
not support a private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations. See id. at 284
n.4.
133. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 (addressing respondent's argument that
rights-creating language create claim of right).
134. Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18
(1979)) (denying argument that language in regulation can create private cause of
action).
135. Id.
136. See id. (discussing respondent's argument that Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, § 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 and Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987, § 6, 102 Stat. § 31, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a ratified court's decisions finding
implied right of action for disparate-impact regulations).
137. See id. (dismissing respondent's argument as unfounded).
138. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 292 (discussing § 1003 of Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986 and § 6 of Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987). The Court
found that neither amendment created a private right of action through incorporation. See id.
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b. South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Department
of Environmental Protection
The plaintiffs in South Camden are residents of Waterfront
South, a neighborhood composed primarily of African-American
and Hispanic citizens. 139 In 1999, St. Lawrence, a cement company
and co-defendant in the case, purchased property to build a grinding facility.' 40 Pursuant to these plans, St. Lawrence contacted co14 1
defendants, NJDEP, and applied for a permit for the facility.
On August 23, 2000, NJDEP held a hearing to inform the community about the St. Lawrence permit. 4 2 Due to community concern about the facility, plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint
with EPA and a request for a grievance h.earing with NJDEP, based
on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 4-3 NJDEP did not respond to the request for the grievance hearing and subsequently
issued St. Lawrence's final air permit on October 31, 2000.144

The plaintiffs filed a complaint against NJDEP and NJDEP
Commissioner Robert C. Shinn, Jr. in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing that defendants violated Title VI by issuing the air permit without analyzing the racially
disparate impacts of the facility.' 45 After evaluating briefs, expert
reports and oral arguments, the district court issued an opinion
139. South Camden II, 274 F.3d 771, 774-75 (3d Cir. 2001). Waterfront South
contains two Superfund sites, several contaminated and abandoned industrial sites
and many currently operating facilities, including chemical companies, waste facilities, food processing companies, automotive shops and a petroleum coke transfer
station. See id. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [hereinafter
NJDEP] had also granted permits for the operation of a regional sewage treatment
plant, a trash-to-steam incinerator and a co-generation power plant. See id. Overall, Waterfront South hosts twenty percent of Camden's contaminated sites and has
more than twice the number of facilities with permits to emit air pollution than
does a typical New Jersey zip code. See id.
140. See id. at 775. St. Lawrence manufactures, processes and supplies cement. Id.
141. See id. In order to qualify for the permit, St. Lawrence was required to
conduct an air quality impact analysis to conform with National Ambient Air Quality Standards as well as ensure the operation would not adversely affect the health
of the surrounding citizens. Id. St. Lawrence fulfilled these requirements. Id. On
November 1, 1999, NJDEP informed St. Lawrence of the completion of the permit
process, thereby allowing the company to initiate construction. Id.
142. Id. At the hearing over 120 community members spoke on the issue
while others submitted written comments. Id.
143. Id. Plaintiffs argued that NJDEP violated Title VI by not conducting an
analysis of the racially disparate adverse impact of building the facility. Id.
144. South Camden 11I, 274 F.3d at 775 (explaining inadequacies of NJDEP's
grievance procedures, resulting in grant of permit over public concern).
145. Id. at 775-76. After plaintiffs filed their complaint, the parties granted St.
Lawrence permission to intervene in the case. Id. at 776.
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(South Camden 1)146 granting the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction. 147 The court determined that section 602 and its implementing regulations contained an implied private right of action,
thereby requiring NJDEP to perform a Title VI analysis.1 48
On April 24, 2001, the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Sandoval impliedly eliminated the private right of action on
which the district court based its decision in South Camden . 149 After allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include section 1983 as an alternate basis of relief, the district court issued an
order continuing the preliminary injunction accompanied by a supplemental opinion (South Camden i). 150 On June 12, 2001, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted St. Lawrence's request for
expedited review of the claim. 15 1
In deciding whether to uphold the injunction, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed "whether plaintiffs can advance a
cause of action to enforce section 602 of Title VI and its implementing regulation through section 1983."152 In analyzing section 1983,
the court stated that section 1983 extends beyond constitutional
and equal rights violations and into rights created under federal
146. 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001) (granting plaintiffs request for preliminary injunction based on finding of private cause of action under § 602).
147. South Camden IIl, 274 F.3d at 775-76; see also S. Camden Citizens in Action
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter South
Camden 1] (holding that § 602 and its implementing regulations contain implied
right of action).
148. South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 776 (citing South Camden 1) (finding plaintiffs entitled to relief and remanding matter to NJDEP for Title VI analysis).
149. See id. In response to the Supreme Court's decision, St. Lawrence moved
to dissolve the injunction. Id. The Supreme Court denied this motion. Id. For a

discussion of Sandoval see supra notes 104-38 and accompanying text.
150. South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 776 (citing S. Camden Citizens in Action v.
N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter South
Camden II]). The court denied St. Lawrence's motion to dissolve the injunction
and allowed the parties to brief the remaining claims, particularly on the issue of
"whether plaintiffs' intentional discrimination charge and/or their section 1983
claim could provide an alternate basis for relief." Id. The supplemental opinion
accompanying the order relied on Powell v. Ridge, which held that § 1983 could
support a disparate-impact claim for violating regulations promulgated pursuant
to § 602. Id. (citing Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999)).
151. See id. (outlining procedural history of case). On June 15, 2001 the
Third Circuit granted St. Lawrence's request to suspend the preliminary injunction pending appeal. See id.
152. Id. at 777. The court noted that to uphold the "extraordinary remedy"
of injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) the reasonable
probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably
injured if relief is not granted. Id. A court should also take into account the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction and the public interest. Id.
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statutes. 153 The court noted that a section 1983 remedy was not

available in two circumstances: (1) "where Congress has foreclosed
such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself' and (2)
"where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or
immunities within the meaning of section 1983."' 154 The court

framed the underlying issue as whether a regulation can create a
right enforceable through section 1983 where the alleged right is in
55
the regulation and not explicitly in the statute.
Initially, the Third Circuit denied the district court's finding
that the United States Supreme Court and Third Circuit Court of
Appeals have already answered this issue in the affirmative.' 56 The
Third Circuit acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority157 that "valid federal regulations may create rights enforceable

under section 1983."158 The Third Circuit, however, distinguished
the case by noting that, in Wright, Congress had already conferred a
specific right through the statute. 59 The Third Circuit similarly
distinguished their earlier decisions, Alexander v. Polk16° and West
Virginia Hospital v. Casey.' 6 1 The Third Circuit distinguished Polk
because the regulations at issue in that case did not attempt to create a federal right beyond any that Congress intended to create in
153. See id. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
d. at 779 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
154. Id. (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth.,
479 U.S. 418 (1987)) (discussing exceptions to enforcement under § 1983).
155. South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 781. Plaintiffs argued that EPA's statutory
provisions and accompanying regulations created enforceable federal fights
through section 1983. See id.
156. Id. at 782.
157. 479 U.S. 418 (1987). Plaintiffs based their argument on a federal statute
imposing a rent ceiling. See id. at 419. They argued that the statute's regulation
gave them an enforceable right of action under section 1983. See id.
158. South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 782-84 (stating holding in Wright).
159. See id. (discussing reasoning in Wright).
160. 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding first that Title V1 directly reached
only instances of intentional discrimination and second that actions having unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement purpose of Title VI).
161. 885 F.2d 11, 16-18 (3d Cir. 1989) (setting forth conditions that can lead
to recognition of private right of action not explicitly created).
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enacting the statute. 1 62 In Casey, the court decided whether a plaintiff could assert a claim against state officials under section 1983 for
alleged violation of the federal Medicaid statute. 163 There, the
court determined that because this was the question presented, the
broader statement - that "valid federal regulations as well as federal
statutes may create rights enforceable under section 1983" - was
64
merely dicta. 1

The Third Circuit had a more difficult time reconciling Powell
v. Ridge.165 In Powell, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals discussed
inter alia two major issues: 1) whether a plaintiff had a private right
of action available to enforce a regulation implementing Title VI
and 2) whether section 1983 provided a private right of action for
violating a Title VI regulation. 66 Although the Powell court decided both questions affirmatively, the Third Circuit determined
that the district court had overextended this holding. 16 7 The Third
Circuit found that Powell was decided on the premise that section
602 and the regulations at issue included a private right of action.168 The court suggested that in Powell they merely "assumed"
that section 1983 created an enforceable right for Title VI regulations for the purpose of rejecting three of defendants' arguments. 169 Furthermore, the Third Circuit stated that even if the
Powell court had determined that the regulations created a private
right of action under section 1983, the holding did not survive the
7
Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval.1 0
162. South Camden ll, 274 F.3d at 783-84 (noting Polk court did not expressly

analyze whether federal regulation could create enforceable § 1983 right).
163. Id. at 784 (quoting Casey). The court noted that in Casey the federal
Medicaid statute, not regulations, created an enforceable right through section

1983. See id.
164. Id. (distinguishing Casey because that court relied only on Polk and
Wright in determining that federal statutes and regulations may create rights under

§ 1983).
165. 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999); see South
Camden I1, 274 F.3d at 784-85 (discussing court's holding in Powell).
166. See South Camden II, 274 F.3d at 784 (addressing issues on appeal).
167. Id.
168. See id. (discussing district court's error in interpreting Powell).
169. See id. at 784-85. The court stated that Powell did not address "whether a

regulation in itself can create a right enforceable under section 1983." Id. at 784.
Instead, the court authorized section 1983 for countering defendant's arguments

that: (1) [d]efendants were not "persons" amenable to suit under section 1983; (2)
that the comprehensive enforcement scheme of Title VI precluded a section 1983
claim and (3) that precedent barring claims under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 should bar the section 1983 claim. Id. (citing Powell, 189
F.3d 387, 400-03 (3d Cir. 1999)).

170. See id. at 785 n.9. The court also determined that South Camden II was
not based merely on the Third Circuit's decision in Powell, but on an independent
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In reviewing other circuit court decisions, the Third Circuit
noted the split on whether a regulation alone may create an enforceable right under section 1983.171 In Smith v. Kirk,172 the
Fourth Circuit held that an administrative regulation cannot create
an enforceable section 1983 interest not implicit in the enforcing
statute. 173 In Harrisv. James,' 74 the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' claim that section 1983 allowed them to enforce a right contained within the regulations of the Medicaid Act. 175 In holding
that the regulations did not create a right under section 1983, the
court stated that the "nexus between the regulation and Congressional intent to create federal rights [was] simply too tenuous to
create an enforceable right to transportation [for Medicaid
recipients] ."176

The Third Circuit acknowledged the contrary finding in Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn.177 In Loschiavo, the Sixth Circuit held that
administrative regulations may create rights under section 1983 beexamination of section 1983. See id. The court went on to perform its own analysis
of the statute. See id.
171. See South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 785-88 (discussing decisions of Fourth,
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits).
172. 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) (considering whether § 1983 provides
cause of action when state violated Social Security Act regulations by placing economic needs test on disabled person needing rehabilitation services).
173. See South Camden II, 274 F.3d at 786 (quoting Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d
980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987)) (noting United States Supreme Court has never held that
administrative regulations create enforceable § 1983 interest).
174. 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997). Harris v. James addressed a Medicaid regulation that required states to provide non-emergency transportation to health
providers. See id. at 996. The plaintiffs argued that section 1983 allowed them to
enforce these regulations. See id.
175. See South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 786 (explaining Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Harris).
176. Id. at 787 (quoting Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009-10). In reaching this conclusion the court stated:
[Sbo long as the statute itself confers a specific right upon the plaintiff,
and a valid regulation merely further defines or fleshes out the content of
that right, then the statute-'in conjunction with the regulation'-may
create a federal right as further defined by the regulation ....
[But], if
the regulation defines the content of a statutory provision that creates no
federal right under the three-prong test, or if the regulation goes beyond
explicating the specific content of the statutory provision and imposes
distinct obligations in order to further the broad objectives underlying
the statutory provision, we think the regulation is too far removed from
Congressional intent to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under section 1983. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the driving
force of

. .

. the Supreme Court's directive that courts must find that

Congress has unambiguously conferred federal rights on the plaintiff.
Id. at 786-87 (alteration in original).
177. See id. at 787 (analyzing Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th
Cir. 1994)).
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cause regulations have the force of law. 178 The Third Circuit rejected this approach as contrary to the Supreme Court's more
recent emphasis on using statutory intent to determine whether
1 79
federal rights exist.
Finally, the Third Circuit concluded that section 1983 could
not support a right to be free of disparate impact because the
United States Supreme Court stated that such a right does not exist
under section 601 or 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.180 Reiterating the principles of Sandoval, the Third Circuit stated that section 601 applies only to intentional discrimination. 181 While EPA's
regulations under section 602 speak of disparate impact, the United
States Supreme Court in Sandoval stated that Congress did not intend for regulations under section 602 to create rights.' 8 2 Furthermore, if the United States Supreme Court found that section 601
prohibits only intentional discrimination, it cannot follow that section 602 proscribes the right to be free from disparate impact discrimination.1 8 3 Lastly, the Third Circuit stated that if Congress
intended for a right to exist under section 602 they would have expressly created one.' 8 4 Considering the potentially far-reaching effects of this decision, the Third Circuit concluded that Congress
had the duty to create the right, not a court or administrative
18 5
agency.

178. See id. (stating holding of Loschiavo).
179. See id. at 788 (citing Wright v City of Roanoke City Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987)).
180. See South Camden II,274 F.3d at 788 ("It can hardly be argued reasonably
that the right alleged to exist in the EPA's regulations, namely to be free of disparate impact discrimination in the administration of programs or activities receiving
EPA assistance, can be located in either section 601 or section 602 of Title VI.").
181. See id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001)).
182. See id. at 789 (stating § 602 limits agencies to effectuating rights created
under § 601).
183. Id. at 789-90 (finding regulations are "too far removed from Congressional intent to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under section 1983.")
(quoting Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997)).
184. Id. at 790 (stating "if there is to be a private enforceable right under Title
VI to be free from disparate impact discrimination, Congress, and not an administrative agency or a court, must create this right.").
185. See South Camden Il,274 F.3d at 790. The court noted that many parties
filed amicus curiae briefs due to the case's far-reaching implications. See id. The
court also recognized that over forty federal agencies have adopted disparate impact regulations. See id. Therefore, the impact of finding that section 1983 supports a claim of right under regulations would be pervasive. See id.
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CONCLUSION

Impact on Environmental Justice Litigation

Sandoval and South Camden III bar environmental litigants'
claims under Title VI and section 1983.1s6 Sandoval eliminates the
theory that an implied right of action exists to enforce disparateimpact regulations under section 602.187 Though only a circuit
court case, South Camden III potentially makes section 1983 unavailable for plaintiffs seeking to prove disparate-impact discrimination. 188 The only remaining claim of right requires a plaintiff to
prove intentional discrimination under section 601.189 As demonstrated in Equal Protection litigation, plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed under the burden of proving intentional discrimination. 9°
B.

Future of Environmental Justice Movement

Without Title VI as an avenue for relief, environmental justice
activists must consider other methods to promote the movement.
Though the plaintiffs in South Camden III were not successful, their

effort has further advanced the struggle for environmental justice. 19 1 The attention from this case has sparked a statewide com92
munity group called New Jersey Environmental Justice Network.1
Containing citizens of various New Jersey cities, the group intends
93
to use strength in numbers to fight existing NJDEP policies.
Ripples from South Camden III have also reached the NewJersey

state government.' 94 A public hearing evaluated a new rule requiring businesses interested in building pollution-generating plants to
186. See Montag & Trinkle, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that South Camden III
precludes plaintiffs right to enforce disparate impact regulations in federal court).
187. For a discussion of Alexander v. Sandoval, see supra notes 104-38 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of South Camden III, see supra notes 139-85 and accompanying text.
189. See Guardians Assn. V Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582
(1983) (holding that § 601 solely covers claims of intentional discrimination).
190. For a discussion of environmental racism claims under the Equal Protection clause, see supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
191. See Drake, supra note 1, at 27 (stating that despite outcome, South Camden
III forwarded environmental justice agenda); see alsoJames Ahearn, When Cement Is
Mixed With Activism, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Mar. 10, 2002, at 2 (discussing rules created in response to South Camden III requiring business owners to consult with community).
192. See Drake, supra note 1, at 27 (discussing emergence of group after years
of organizing).
193. See id.
194. See Ahearn, supra note 191, at 2.
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first consult with residents of the surrounding community. 9 5

Should the proposed rule become law, citizens of minority communities may begin to get the respect and consideration they have
been seeking. Thus, although South Camden III may mark the demise of environmental racism litigation through Title VI, the fight
for environmental justice through community and political activism
remains an alternative avenue.
Daniel V. Madrid
195. See id. Though NJDEP drafted the rule three years ago, the new state
administration has just recently held a public hearing on it. See id. New Jersey
would be the first state to adopt such a rule. See id.
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